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FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE: SUPREME COURT
AUTHORIZES TRANSFER BY A COURT LACKING
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
SZCnON 1406 (a) of the Judicial Code' permits a federal district
court to cure a defect in venue by transferring an action to a forum
where proper venue exists. The decisions of lower federal courts
have conflicted concerning the validity of a transfer under section
1406 (a) when the transferring court not only has a venue defect but
also lacks jurisdiction over the defendants. 2 In Goldlawr, Inc. v.
Heiman,3 the Supreme Court resolved his conflict by holding that
a district court which failed to meet venue requirements and lacked
personal jurisdiction over the defendants could nevertheless transfer
the action to a district court in which both could be satisfied.
Plaintiff brought a private antitrust action for treble damages and
injunctive relief in a Pennsylvania district court under Section 4 of
the Clayton Act4 for alleged violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.5 Defendants moved to dismiss the suit on the grounds
of improper venue and lack of personal jurisdiction. The court
found venue to be improperly laid as to two of the corporate de-
fendants," but declined to dismiss. Instead it transferred the action
to an appropriate New York forum by authority of section 1406 (a).7
1 28 u.s.C. §1406(a) (1958).
* For federal courts allowing transfer under § 1406 (a) absent personal jurisdiction,
see, e.g., Hayes v. Livermont, 279 F.2d 818 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Amerio Contact Plate
Freezers, Inc. v. Knowles, 274 F.2d 590, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Orion Shipping & Trading
Co. v. United States, 247 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1957); Internatio-Rotterdam, Inc. v.
Thomsen, 218 F.2d 514, 516 (4th Cir. 1955); Orzulak v. Federal Commerce & Nay.
Co., 168 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Pa. 1958); United States v. Welch, 151 F. Supp. 899
(S.D.N.Y. 1957); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Mohr, 87 F. Supp. 727 (S.D. Tex. 1949);
cf. Schiller v. Mit-Clip Co., 180 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1950), which has been cited as
authority for allowing transfer without personal jurisdiction, but which actually does
not reach the point. For courts not allowing transfer, see e.g., Atlantic Ship Rigging
Co. v. McLellan, 288 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1961); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 288 F.2d 579
(2d Cir. 1961); Hohensee v. News Syndicate, Inc., 286 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1961) ; Goldlawr,
Inc. v. Shubert, 175 F. Supp. 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Independent Prods. Corp. v. Loew's,
Inc., 148 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y 1957).
$369 U.S. 463 (1962).
'38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
526 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1958).
6The alternative prerequisites for venue under § 12 of the Clayton Act are that
defendant inhabit, be found, or transact business in the state in which the action is
brought 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §22 (1958).
7 Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 169 F. Supp. 677, 680 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
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Upon transfer, defendants renewed their motion to dismiss on the
ground that the Pennsylvania district court lacked personal juris-
diction and thus had no power to invoke section 1406 (a). The New
York district court granted defendants' motion8 and the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.9 The Supreme Court
reversed the dismissal, holding that the language of section 1406 (a)
is broad enough to allow transfer regardless of whether the trans-
ferring court had personal jurisdiction.
In the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Black stated that section
1406 (a) was enacted to rectify the injustice resulting from dismissal
of an action brought by a plaintiff who in good faith had chosen a
district in which venue was improper. The statute of limitations
had run on a number of the alleged violations in the present case,
the Court noted, and dismissal would result in plaintiff's losing
a substantial part of its claim merely because it had mistakenly
believed the defendant corporations could be found in Pennsyl-
vania.10 In such a situation, the majority continued, an interpre-
tation allowing courts lacking personal jurisdiction to toll a statute
by transferring the action is in keeping with the modem procedural
trend away from justice-defeating technicalities.
Prior to 1948, an action commenced in a federal district court
where venue was improperly laid was dismissed upon seasonable
motion by defendant." The resulting hardship to the plaintiff led
Congress to enact in that year a statute reversing the common law
practice and making mandatory transfer of the action to an appropri-
ate forim.12 Subsequent to the 1949 amendment resulting in a
compromise between these two positions, transfer has been author-
8 Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 175 F. Supp. 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 288 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1961).
20Defendants were subsidiary corporations which provided a central bookkeeping
and service department for a parent corporation operating in Pennsylvania through
other wholly owned subsidiaries. The Pennsylvania district court decided that the
business transacted in Pennsylvania was insufficient to warrant holding that the de-
fendants were doing business there for venue purposes. See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert,
169 F. Supp. 677 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
% %See, e.g., Camp v. Gress, 250 U.S. 308 (1919), where the Court voided a judgment
and dismissed a suit against a defendant who properly objected to the venue. It was
held that when one or more of several defendants are not found in the district, they
cannot be compelled to submit to the jurisdiction of the court. See also Schoen v.
Mountain Producers Corp., 170 F.2d 707, 713 (3d Cir. 1948) (complaint dismissed upon
seasonable motion).
22 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (a) (1948), provided that "the district court of a district in which
is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall transfer such case
to any district or division in which it could -have been brought." (Emphasis added.)
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ized only in the interest of justice. In all other cases, the action
must be dismissed.13
When the question has arisen as to whether section 1406 (a) can
be invoked in the absence of personal jurisdiction, one line of federal
authority has permitted transfer, while another has refused to do
so.-4 The specific wording of section 1406 (a), the general canons of
statutory interpretation, and the legislative history of the statute,
have all been relied upon by advocates of both positions.
Since section 1406 (a) speaks only of defective venue and does
not mention jurisdiction, it has been argued that there can be no
transfer under that section if there is a defect of personal jurisdic-
tion.m ' 5 This argument cuts both ways, for nothing in the language
of section 1406 (a) indicates that it was intended to be operative
only when the transferring court has personal jurisdiction. 0 Equally
inconclusive are the canons of statutory interpretation which require
that a remedial statute be broadly construed 7 and that a revolution-
ary statute be narrowly construed. 8 Section 1406 (a) is both reme-
dial and revolutionary. The only congressional text touching on
the statute 9 is a Senate report explaining the purpose of the 1949
amendment. 0 Though this report does not address itself to a
situation where no service can be obtained by the transferring
court, it was interpreted by the court of appeals in the instant case
as showing an implicit congressional intent to make section 1406 (a)
128 U.S.C. § 1406 (a) (1958). "4See cases cited note 2 supra.1GSee, e.g., Hohensee v. News Syndicate, Inc., 286 F.2d 527, 530 (3d Cir. 1961). In
this case it was also argued that if a defendant is improperly served and fails to appear
specially to contest jurisdiction and venue, a court has no means of ascertaining the
interests of justice and therefore cannot transfer. This argument is irrelevant, for
venue must be challenged by a litigant before § 1406 (a) will be invoked. If defendant
does not appear, a default judgment will be rendered against him.
1-6 This observation was made by the dissent in the instant case in the court below.
See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 288 F.2d 579, 589 (2d Cir. 1961).1
'See, e.g., Lambur v. Yates, 148 F.2d 137, 139 (8th Cir. 1945). See generally,
BLACK, CONSTRUarxON AND INTERPRETATION op Tn LAws § 113 (2d ed. 1911); 2 SuTF.n-
LAND, STATUTORY CoNsmRuafON §§ 573-75 (2d ed. 1904).
78 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 288
F.2d 579, 582 (2d Cir. 1961).
10 94 CONG. REC. 8498-501 (1948); Comment, 1962 Wis. L. REv. 342.
2o S. R P. No. 303, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949), stated:
It is thought that this provision may be subject to abuse in that a plaintiff
might deliberately bring a suit in a wrong division or district where he could get
service on the defendant, and when the question of venue is raised the court
is required to transfer the case to the court where it 'could have been brought.'
However, in the meantime, service has been perfected on a defendant In the
wrong venue, aid it will carry over into the new (and proper) venue.
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operative only after valid service of process is obtained. 21 The
dissent, on the other hand, stated that a careful reading of the legisla-
tive history suggests no such restriction.2
The Supreme Court paid little attention to the technical consid-
erations which plagued the lower courts. Indeed, the brief majority
opinion in Goldlawr is based almost exclusively on policy grounds
and adherence to the liberal trend in federal procedural matters.
As a result, this decision implicitly raises two diverse problems.
The first involves the effect of this holding on actions controlled by
state statutes of limitation; the second, whether to apply this holding
to actions arising under section 1404 (a),2 ,3 the other transfer statute.
Filing a complaint will toll the statute of limitations applicable
to actions in a federal court under federal statutes. 24 Many states,
however, specify that valid service of process is necessary to toll
statutes of limitation applicable to state created rights.25 The Court
in Goldlawr did not differentiate between the two situations, stating
that filing a complaint indicates a plaintiff's desire to toll whatever
statutes of limitation apply.; O The wisdom of this broad generaliza-
tion is questionable, for to apply Goldlawr to situations involving
state statutes of limitation would entail a reversal of the recognized
rule27 that a district court, in a diversity action, must apply both
the state statute of limitations and the state rule governing the
manner in which it is tolled. Such an application would also be
in disharmony with the present extension of the Erie doctrine per-
mitting federal procedural law to be applied only when it does not
override a significant state policy.28
'1 Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 288 F.2d 579, 583 (2d Cir. 1961).
"'d. at 589. 2 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a) (1948).
26 See, e.g., Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 186, 140 (2d Cir. 1947), where the court stated
that rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have "with some modification
adopted the practice which was apparently general in equity: i.e., that the filing of the
complaint... will toll the statute."
-1 See, e.g., Ragan v. Merchants' Transfer S- Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
., 369 U.S. at 467.
27 See, e.g., the leading case of Ragan v. Merchants' Transfer 8- Warehouse Co.,
37 U.S. 580 (1949).
28 For a discussion concerning present day extension of the basic holding in Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 US. 64 (1938), see Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949). The Court there stated that Erie and its progeny have
wrought a far reaching effect whereby in diversity cases the federal court admin-
isters the state system of laws in all except details. See also Ragan v. Merchants'
Transfer 9. Warehouse Co., 387 U.S. 530 (1949), where the court held that since a
cause of action in a diversity suit is created by local law, it is subject to the same
burdens and defenses in the federal court as in a state court, and consequently,
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The second problem raised by the opinion involves section
1404 (a),2 1 the legislative sibling of section 1406 (a). Under section,
1404 (a), an action may be transferred by a court which has proper
venue if such transfer is demanded for the convenience of parties and
witnesses and is in the interest of justice. Federal courts have over-
whelmingly disallowed transfer under section 1404 (a) when per-
sonal jurisdiction was lacking in the transferring court.30 In his
dissenting opinion in Goldlawr,31 Mr. Justice Harlan argued that
it was incongruous to allow transfer under section 1406 (a) by a court
having neither venue nor personal jurisdiction but not to allow it
by a court having venue but lacking personal jurisdiction.32 It
seems that Goldlawr allows, if not demands, an interpretation of
section 1404 (a) which would authorize a court having venue but
lacking personal jurisdiction to transfer an action. Though section
1406 (a) remedies defects in venue, and section 1404 (a) authorizes
transfer where venue is proper but a different forum is more de-
sirable, there are strong indications that they are not to be dis-
tinguished 33  There is no logical reason for requiring personal
jurisdiction under one but not the other.3 4
a cause of action cannot be given a "longer life in the federal court than it would have
had in the state court without adding something to the cause of action." Id. at 533-34
2928 U.S.C. § 1404 (a) (1948), provides that "for the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to
any other district or division where it might have been brought." (Emphasis added.)
30The lone case allowing transfer without personal jurisdiction under § 1404 (a)
was Petroleum Financial Corp. v. Stone, 116 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). For cases
holding contra see Hargrove v. Louisville & Nashville R.IL, 153 F. Supp. 681 (W.D.
Ky. 1957); Cogburn v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 535 (E.D.S.C.
1955); Brock v. Jenkins, 120 F. Supp, 879 (M.D. Ga. 1954); Burns v. Chubb, 99 F. Supp.
581 (E.D. Pa. 1951); Scarmardo v. Mooring, 89 F. Supp. 936 (S.D. Tex. 1950).
at 69 U.S. at 468.
32 Mr. Justice Harlan did not mention § 1404(a), though that section has been
applied to situations where a court has venue but lacks personal jurisdiction. See
cases cited in note 30 supra. The dissenter instead relied on cases decided prior
to the enactment of either § 1406 (a) or § 1404 (a). See footnote, 369 U.S. at 468.
"See, e.g., Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 175 F. Supp. 793, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1959);
Petroleum Financial Corp. v. Stone, 116 F. Supp. 426, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). See
generally, 1 MooREa, FEDERAL PRAMcnC 0.146[5] at 1097 (2d ed. 1951). Courts have
probably refused to allow transfer in such situations because § 1404 (a) is the codifica-
tion of the forum.non conveniens doctrine which demands personal jurisdiction as a
prerequisite to transfer. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). However,
§ 1404 (a) differs from the common law doctrine and its words should be considered
for what they say, not with preconceived limitations. See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick,
849 U.S. 29, 31 (1955). In-this connection, see Bankruptcy Act § 32, ch. 10, 80 Stat:
554 (1898) (amended by 52 Star. 857 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §55 (1958)).
Subsections (b) and (c) incorporate respectively the general substance of § 1406 (a)
and § 1404(a). See H.R. RE. No. 2320, 82d Cong. 2d Sess. (1952). These two subi
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The liberal Goldlawr transfer rule will aid plaintiffs who hon-
estly but erroneously believe that they have chosen the proper forum.
The holding, however, will not permit a plaintiff indiscriminately
and in bad faith to institute suit in any forum and then -move for
a transfer when it is determined that venue and jurisdiction- over
defendant are lacking. Since transfer is permitted only in the
interest of justice, it is clear that the plaintiff is required to act
diligently and in good faith. Furthermore, the defendant must be
neither harassed nor prejudiced, and the transferee court must -not
be unduly burdened.35 Few plaintiffs will risk losing a meritorious
claim merely to harass a defendant; furthermore, personal juris-
diction will have to be obtained by the court to which the action
is transferred, 8 thus affording additional protection from harassment
to the defendant. A transfer rather than a dismissal will prevent
the time consuming process of reinstituting suit in another district,
and the court dockets will be relieved, for plaintiffs will have less
reason to commence simultaneous actions in a number of district
forums.
Section 1406 (a) is only one of the procedural rules necessary to
bring together proper litigants in courts qualified to adjudicate their
controversies. While some of these rules are clear, even skilled ad-
vocates cannot foresee what a court will decide in a close case in-
sections have been interpreted liberally and in the light of each other. See, e.g., In the
Matter of Eatherton, 271 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1959); In the Matter of Martinez, 241 F2d
345 (10th cir. 1957).
31 Prior to Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960), the trend had been toward a
liberal interpretation of § 1404 (a). See 1961 Dux4n L.J. 349, 352. Though the Court
refused to allow a transfer in Blasid, the facts were readily distinguishable from
the situation in Goldlawr. In Blaski, a defendant moved for a transfer from a dis-
trict court where both venue and personal jurisdiction were proper to a district where
venue was improper at the time of the commencement of the suit. Mr. Justice Harlan,
the dissenter in the liberal opinion in Goldlawr, also joined in the dissent against
strict interpretation in BlaskI.
Or The factual situation in Goldlawr illustrates these elements. Plaintiff insti-
tuted suit within the statutory period in a district in which it believed defendant could
be found. Defendant New York corporations were not harassed by a suit instituted
in the nearby Eastern District of Pennsylvania, nor did they even claim to be
prejudiced. The court was not burdened unduly, for had no transfer been allowed,
plaintiff might have commenced a new action in. the New York district court for the
part of the claim not barred by the statute of limitations.
81 When a transfer is authorized under § 1406 (a), a plaintiff may avoid subsequent
dismissal only by making service upon defendant without further delay. See 5 Moom,
FEDER"L PAnCzC 41.11 at 1089 (2d ed. 1951). The issuance of process has no bear-
ing on the determination of the time when a suit is commenced under a federal
statute. U.N. Relief & Rehabilitation Administration v. The Mormacmail, 99 F. Supp.
552, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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volving venue or jurisdiction.3 It is apparent that the Supreme
Court in Goldlawr, by allowing transfer by a court lacking personal
jurisdiction, has shown impatience with procedural technicalities
which destroy the remedy of a diligent plaintiff. Although in the
f-uture the Court should limit the doctrine to cases arising under
federal statutes of limitation, Goldlawr probably will have far reach-
ing side effects in the revamping of judicial interpretation in similar
cases arising under section 1404 (a).
2TDifficulties frequently arise in determining where corporations can be found or
transact business. See, e.g., Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 45 U.S. 663 (1953);
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Kilpatrick v. Texas &
P. Ry., 166 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1948).
